This paper studies the nonparametric identification of contract models with adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, we consider the false moral hazard model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986) . We first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions. We establish the nonparametric identification of the demand, cost, deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the structural model, which are the firm's type, the demand, cost and transfer shocks. The cost of public funds is identified with the help of some instrument. Lastly, testable restrictions of the model are obtained.
Introduction
Over the past thirty years, economists have emphasized the fundamental role played by asymmetric information in economic relationships. The imperfect knowledge of key economic variables induces strategic behavior among economic agents. Contracts provide an important example of how information asymmetry and incentives govern relationships between a principal and an agent. Imperfect information takes the form of some agent's hidden characteristics or type and some agent's hidden action or effort leading to the socalled adverse selection and moral hazard problems, respectively. See Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) .
In this paper, we focus on the mixed model combining adverse selection and moral hazard developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986) for procurement and regulation. This model is also associated with false moral hazard as observation of the contractual variable allows the principal to disentangle imperfectly the agent's type and effort level.
1 Two reasons motivate our interest. First, the Laffont and Tirole (1986) model is a control problem under incomplete information whose results have a broader impact than procurement and regulation. See Laffont (1994) . Second, from an empirical point of view, data on contracts and procurements are readily available from regulatory commissions or public agencies while contract terms are in general well defined in terms of objectives assigned 1 An alternative approach relies on the obedience principle, in which the principal induces the agent to produce a given level of effort. See Myerson (1982) .
to the firm and compensation arrangements. More generally, contractual arrangements in agriculture, corporate finance, credit markets, insurance and retailing have received much attention recently.
Despite these fundamental theoretical developments and the economic importance of contracts, few empirical studies analyzing contract data rely on a structural modeling.
As a matter of fact, the empirical literature is mostly limited to a reduced form approach as surveyed by Chiappori and Salanié (2003) for the analysis of contracts in general and Joskow and Rose (1989) for regulation. Some notable exceptions adopting a structural approach while incorporating some aspects of optimal contracting are Paarsch and Shearer (2000), d'Haultfoeuille and Février (2007) and Gayle and Miller (2008) for labor contracts, Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) , Miravete (2002) , Crawford and Shum (2007) and Huang, Perrigne and Vuong (2008) for nonlinear pricing, Einav, Jenkins and Levin (2008) for credit markets, Ho, Ho and Mortimer (2008) for retailing, and Wolak (1994) , Thomas (1995) , Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) and Brocas, Chan and Perrigne (2006) for regulation.
This did not meet the expectation of theorists. For instance, Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 669) conclude that "econometric analyses are badly needed in the area," while they "do wish that such a core of empirical analysis will develop in the years to come." Such high expectations have not been met because asymmetric information models lead to complex econometric models whose estimation requires suitable econometric tools.
2 Moreover, the issue of identification needs to be addressed. Though the analyst may end up specifying a parametric model as in the above papers, studying nonparametric identification is valuable for thinking carefully about which information in the data allows one to identify each unknown function. Another important related question is to characterize the restrictions imposed by the model on observables to test the model validity. Without such restrictions, the model could rationalize any data.
In this paper, we adopt a nonparametric approach in the spirit of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) to address the identification of the procurement model of Laffont and Tirole (1986) . Our results are general in the sense that other contract models can be identified using a similar approach. We first adapt their model by considering a private good with a random demand. The contract design then considers expected demand, while
In this section we extend the Laffont and Tirole's (1986) procurement model to a monopolist producing a private good subject to general random demand and cost functions.
4
The demand for the private good and the cost for producing it are
where y is the quantity of private good with a price per unit p, c is the realized cost, θ represents the agent's (inefficiency) type, e is the level of effort exerted by the firm, and ( d , c ) are the random demand and cost shocks, respectively. As usual, θ and e are private information to the firm, where θ is the (scalar) adverse selection parameter known to be distributed as F (·). The random shocks ( d , c ) are known to be jointly distributed as G (·, ·) . Note that c is independent of θ in Laffont and Tirole (1986) , while d is void because the demand y is fixed. Laffont and Tirole (1986) consider a constant marginal cost function, namely c = (θ − e)y + c , while Laffont and Tirole (1993, p.171) consider the cost function c = H(θ − e)c o (y) + c , which is, except for the additive separability of ex post information is used. Such an observed performance indicator leads to false moral hazard. In the context of regulation, Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) and Baron (1989) argue that cost observability by the regulator is a reasonable assumption as firms are submitted to annual audit of their financial results and costs by regulatory commissions.
The random shocks ( d , c ) are realized ex post, i.e. after contractual arrangements are made between the principal and the firm. Consequently, the contract is designed ex ante based on expected values with respect to ( d , c ). Upon accepting the contract, the firm must satisfy the realized demand y = y [p(θ) , d ] at the price p(θ) corresponding to its announcementθ. The principal and the firm are both risk neutral.
We assume that all functions are at least twice continuously differentiable and that integration and differentiation can be interchanged. Whenever a(·) is a function of more than one variable, we denote its derivative with respect to the kth argument by a k (·).
The Firm's Problem
Given the price p(·) and payment t(·, ·), the utility for the firm with type θ when it announcesθ and exerts effort e with monetary cost ψ(e) is
The firm's optimization problem is (F ) max
where the independence between θ and ( d , c ) is used. This problem can be solved in two steps. In the first step, the effort level e is chosen optimally given (θ, θ)
This gives e = e(θ, θ), which solves the first-order condition (FOC)
i.e. using (1), e = e(θ, θ) solves
Denote the corresponding expected utility by
In the second step, the firm solves maxθ U (θ, θ) givingθ =θ(θ), which solves the FOC U 1 (θ, θ) = 0.
Incentive Constraint
We now consider the Incentive Constraint (IC) arising from the firm telling the truth θ, θ, θ) , and using
where the third equality follows from (2) since e(θ) = e(θ, θ), and the fourth equality from
(1). Hence, using (3) atθ = θ and e = e(θ) = e(θ, θ) gives the incentive constraint
where
e(θ) = arg max
The latter reduces moral hazard to a "false" moral hazard problem.
The Principal's Problem
The principal chooses the price schedule and the transfer [
is such that (i) it is truth telling, i.e. (5) is satisfied and the firm exerts the optimal effort e = e(θ), and (ii) the firm participates for any level of its type θ. Given that the good is private, the ex post social welfare when θ is the firm's true type is
where λ > 0 is the cost of public funds as the payment requires raising taxes, which are costly to society. 5 Thus, using the independence of θ and ( d , c ), its expectation is
where we have used (6) to rewrite the expected transfer as U (θ) + ψ(e(θ)). Therefore, the principal's optimization problem is
subject to the incentive and the participation constraints
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] , where e(·) is given by (7). Without loss of generality, the optimization problem (P) includes e(·) since this function is determined by p(·) and U (·) through (6) and (7). In view of (9), U (θ) < 0 because ψ (·) > 0 (see A2 below). Hence, the participation constraint (10) can be written as U (θ) ≥ 0 or
because the expected social welfare (8) decreases with U (·). This suggests to consider the simpler optimization problem
subject to (9) and (11) only. In Section 2.4, we verify that there exists a transfer t * (·, ·)
satisfying (6) and (7) for the solution [p * (·), e * (·), U * (·)] of the optimization problem (P').
We denote the expected demand at price p by
5 Alternatively, following Baron and Myerson (1982) , we could consider a weighted average of the consumer surplus and the firm's profit. See Section 4.3.
denote the expectation of a function a(·, ·, ·) with respect to ( d , c ) for fixed θ, or conditional upon θ in view of the independence of θ and ( d , c ).
Proposition 1: Given A1, the price p * (·) and effort e * (·) that solve the FOC of the optimization problem (P') satisfy
Note thatη p is the elasticity of the expected demand y(p), which differs from the expected elasticity of demand
for producing one additional unit at price p. On the other hand, c o (p) is the expected baseline cost at price p or also the expected cost saving for one additional unit of effort. Thus, (12) can be viewed as a generalized Ramsey pricing, while (13) leads to a downward distortion in effort due to the second term arising from asymmetric information as ψ (·) > 0 (see A2 below). When θ = θ, (13) gives ψ (e) = c o (p) and the first-best is achieved for the most efficient firm θ. 6 It remains to determine the optimal firm's rent U * (θ) by integrating out the incentive constraint (9) subject to the participation constraint (11). This gives
which is strictly positive whenever θ < θ since ψ (·) > 0 (see A2 below).
Implementation
6 When the demand is not random, i.e. d has a degenerate distribution so that (12) and (13) reduce to the FOC in Laffont and Tirole (1986) with a constant marginal cost function and an additive random shock, namely c = (θ − e)y + c .
Proposition 2: Given A1, consider the following transfer
where e * (·) and p * (·) are the optimal price and effort obtained from (P'), and
Thus, announcing its true type θ and exerting the optimal effort e * (θ) satisfy the FOC of
From (15) and (16), the transfer is equal to the cost of effort plus the firm's expected rent minus a fraction of the cost overrun, which is the discrepancy between the realized cost and the expected cost. Thus (15) can be viewed as a menu of linear cost-sharing
so that the slope coefficient in (15) equals -1 whenθ = θ. That is, the most efficient firm chooses a fixed-price contract.
Second-Order Conditions
We verify that our solution corresponds to a global maximum. Following Laffont and Tirole (1986) , we verify ex post that our solution satisfies the second-order conditions (SOC) for a local maximum, and that these SOC extend globally.
Assumption A2: The demand, cost and effort functions satisfy:
Assumption A2-(i) is satisfied if the expected demand is not too inelastic and if the expected demand is not too convex, while A2-(ii,iii) are standard.
We begin with the firm's problem (F). In particular, for any (θ, θ) we consider the optimization problem (FE) with respect to e. 7 The following assumptions are sufficient but not necessary. In Section 4.1, we provide necessary and sufficient assumptions for the second-order conditions and implementation to hold. Because t * (·, ·) is weakly decreasing and concave in realized cost c, Lemma 1 applies.
Second, the local SOC forθ = θ to be a local maximum is U 11 (θ, θ) ≤ 0, which is
when the transfer t(·, ·) is weakly decreasing and concave in c as in (15), Lemma 1 implies that a sufficient condition for the local SOC for truth telling is e (·) ≤ 0.
Assumption A3-(i) is reminiscent of assumption 1-(iii) in Laffont and Tirole (1986) . 3 Identification of [y, c o , ψ, F, G, m] In this section we detail the specification of the econometric model for the observables taking into account observed heterogeneity. We study the identification of the functions [y, c o , ψ, F, G, m] given λ from the distribution of the observables. The additional function m(·) is introduced in Section 3.1.
The Econometric Model
The observables are (Y, C, P, T ), i.e. the quantity of good, the production cost, the price per unit of product, the transfer/payment as well as a vector of exogenous variables In the context of procurement and regulation, two examples may fix ideas on data availability: Water utilities studied by Wolak (1994) and Brocas, Chan and Perrigne (2006) and public transit studied by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002), Perrigne (2002) and Perrigne and Surana (2004) . In the first case, Y represents the total amount of water (measured in hundred cubit feet HCF) delivered to residual consumers by a privately owned utility in California, P is the price per HCF charged to consumers including a fixed access fee, C is the production cost including energy and labor costs as well as other components such as chemicals and pipeline repair, while T is based on the rate of return on firm's capital. 8 In the second case, Y represents the number of passengers taking public transit operated by a firm in France, P is the average bus fare paid by a passenger, C is the operating cost including energy and labor costs as well as various maintenance costs, while T takes the form of a subsidy paid to the firm by the transportation authority. Our econometric model is based on the theoretical model of Section 2 but differs from it by allowing the observed transfer not to be the optimal transfer T * = t * (θ, C, Z).
Specifically, we consider that the observed transfer T deviates from the optimal one (15) by a random quantityT , which is uncorrelated with the firm's type θ given
represents the deterministic component that is common knowledge. The component t is a random term unknown to both parties. As noted by Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) and Joskow (2005) , m(·) can capture possible departures from the model of Section 2 due to some behavioral, legal and institutional constraints. These possible departures, however, do not question the optimality of the transfer t * (θ, C, Z) as the Principal-Agent model of Section 2 is based on the optimization at both levels of the hierarchy.
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We make the following assumption on the random elements (θ, d , c , t ). (15) and (16) evaluated atθ = θ gives the nonlinear nonparametric simultaneous equation
where (19)- (20), and a prime denotes derivation with respect to the first argument of a function. Following Section 2, y (p, z) and (19)- (21) are, conditional upon Z = z, the expected demand at price p and the expected baseline cost for producing the random quantity
The firm's type θ can be viewed as a term of unobserved heterogeneity distributed as F (·|·). A complication of the above econometric model is that the effort e is endogenous though it is unobserved. 11 The structural elements of the model are the cost of public funds λ(·), the deterministic transfer function m(·), the demand y(·, ·, ·), the baseline cost
In short, the structure of the model is given by the vector of seven functions [y, c o , ψ, F, G, λ, m] . The identification problem is to assess whether these primitives can be recovered uniquely from the conditional distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z. For definitions of identification in nonparametric contexts, see e.g. Roehrig (1988) and Prakasa Rao (1992) .
Identification of ψ(·, ·), F (·|·) and m(·) Given λ(·)
In this subsection we study the nonparametric identification of the effort disutility ψ(·, ·),
11 We note that the econometric model would be singular without the random term t because three unobserved random variables (θ, d , c ) would determine four endogenous variables (Y, C, P, T ) .
the conditional distribution of firms' type F (·|·) and the deterministic transfer m(·) assuming that λ(·) is known. Identification of the latter is addressed in Section 4.
the structures S andS lead to the same conditional distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z,
i.e. they are observationally equivalent.
As the proof of Lemma 3 indicates, the observational equivalence between S andS arises because the unknown firm's type θ can be linearly transformed into a new typeθ =
Moreover, any shift in ψ(e, z) depending on z can be compensated by an appropriate shift of m(z).
Location-scale normalizations are therefore needed. For instance, one can fix how two quantiles of θ vary with z such as θ(z) and θ(z), which correspond to the most and least efficient firms, respectively. This corresponds to setting
where θ o (·) and θ o (·) are chosen functions. The normalization, however, must satisfy
, we set the cost inefficiency of the most efficient firm to be one and the optimal effort of the least efficient firm to be zero. Regarding ψ(·, ·), a natural normalization is to impose ψ(0, ·) = 0 following Laffont and Tirole (1993) among others.
The normalization (24) determines θ(z) and θ(z) through the optimal effort function e * (·, z). Moreover, because the optimal effort e * (θ, z) is strictly decreasing in θ, (24) implies that e * (θ, z) ≥ 0 and θ − e * (θ, z) ≥ 1 for all firms so that c o (y, z, c ) is the cost frontier for producing y given (z, c ),
relative cost inefficiency of a firm with type θ relative to the efficient firm with type θ(z).
We now turn to the nonparametric identification of the effort disutility ψ(·, ·) and 
where µ = µ(z). Moreover, the relative cost inefficiency is identified as
The expected demand (25) is just the expectation of Y given (P, Z) despite the possible correlation between the demand shock d and P through Z in the demand (17). On the other hand, the expectation of C (or log C) given (P, Z), as used in the estimation of production/cost frontier (see, e.g. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) Nevertheless, by exploiting the generalized Ramsey pricing rule (19), (26) indicates that the expected baseline cost is identified from the expectations of Y and C given (P, Z) and the knowledge of p(·).
12 Moreover, (27) shows that a firm's relative cost inefficiency θ − e * (θ, z) can be recovered from (p, z) as ∆(·, ·) is known from the expectation of C given (P, Z) and the identified expected baseline cost c o (·, ·).
12 This result is reminiscent to recovering the marginal cost in mark-up models. See Bresnahan (1989) .
The generalized Ramsey pricing rule plays a similar role as a mark-up equation with the exception that recovering c o (·, ·) is somewhat more complicated here because of the unobserved cost inefficiency θ − e.
Using Lemma 4, the next result establishes the nonparametric identification of the effort disutility ψ(·, ·) and the conditional type distribution F (·|·) from observations on
In the spirit of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), we exploit the bijective mapping between the price P and the firm's type θ from Lemma 2. The parallel with auction models becomes clear. In auction models, the unobserved private value can be expressed in terms of the corresponding observed bid, the bid distribution and density, from which one can identify the private value distribution. A similar strategy is used here. Let θ
is the conditional distribution of P given Z and g P |Z (·|·) its density. Using (20) and the identification of ψ(·, ·) from (21), we derive an expression for θ as a function of the observed price, its distribution and density from which we identify the type distribution F (·|·). In particular, the unobserved firm's type θ can be recovered from the observed pair (p, z) once the various unknown functions have been recovered from the data.
For any value (p, z), we define
The functions Γ(·, ·) and R(·, ·) are known from the joint distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) conditional upon Z in view of Lemma 4. In particular, Γ(·, ·) can be interpreted as the marginal decrease in the expected transfer T due to a one-unit increase in relative cost inefficiency ∆. As (30) and (31) below show, Γ(p, z) is also the marginal cost of effort, while R(p, z) is the marginal decrease in effort due to a one-unit increase in price. Let
, z] and p * + (·, z) be the inverse of the optimal effort e *
+ (·, z). Proposition 4: Suppose that A1-A3, B1-B2 hold and λ(·) is known. Thus, the deterministic transfer m(·) and the effort disutility ψ(·, ·) are uniquely determined by p(z) and the conditional mean of T given (P, Z) as
Moreover, the conditional mean of T given (P, Z) and the conditional distribution of P given Z uniquely determine the conditional type distribution
The key of Proposition 4 is that the observed price P is in bijection with the unobserved type θ given Z = z. Thus, conditioning on (P, Z) is also conditioning on (θ, Z).
As a matter of fact, (31) and (32) show that the firm's type θ and effort e can be recovered from the observed pair (P, Z) associated with the firm's contract. In particular, while the minimal effort e * [θ(z), z] = 0 by the normalization (24), (31) implies that the maximal effort exerted by the most efficient firm given Z = z is
Similarly, the lower and upper bounds of the conditional type distribution F (·|z) are
from (32) in view of (26)- (27) and ∆[p(z), z] = 1 from (24). The inequality in (35) follows
Lemma 4 (p, z) showing that y(·, ·, ·) and
tified by Lemma 4. Now, using the control function approach to endogeneity (see Blundell and Powell (2003)
where the second equality follows from the independence of c and P given ( d , Z) from Second, we have a simultaneous equation model, which creates potential endogeneity as Y in the baseline cost may be correlated with the error term c through d .
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The next lemma establishes that the knowledge of the expected demand and baseline cost does not help in identifying the desired functions and distributions. We introduce some notations and make some assumptions. assumes that ( d , c ) is independent of (P, Z), which is equivalent to the conditional independence of ( d , c ) with P given Z and the independence of ( d , c ) with Z. While the former follows from B1, the latter may not be satisfied in our case.
and [y(p, z), y(p, z) ] denote the supports of the conditional distributions G Y |Z (·|z) and
Assumption B3:
(i) For all z ∈ Z, and all
where p o (·) and y o (·) are known.
( for any z ∈ Z. 14 Assumption B3-(iii) is used only to establish Proposition 5-(ii) and is discussed later.
There exists an observationally equivalent sys-
Lemma 5 shows that the normalization (36) does not entail any loss of generality since p o (·) and y o (·) can be chosen arbitrarily. This argument can be easily seen in the demand 14 The second normalization in Matzkin (2003) relates to the homogeneity of degree one in z and .
Such a restriction seems natural for the baseline cost, which is homogenous of degree one in input prices.
See also Matzkin (1994) . This restriction would require to choose some values or functions z o , co , C o and a factor of homogeneity γ. Moreover, because Matzkin's proof relies on using γ = c / co , the conditional distribution of c can be recovered along a specific value of z, i. Thus, its conditional distribution
where G C|Y,P,Z (·|·, ·, ·) is the conditional distribution of C given (Y, P, Z).
Proposition 5: Suppose that A1-A3, B1-B3 hold and λ(·) is known. (i) The demand y(·, ·, ·) and the conditional distribution
(ii) The baseline cost c o (·, ·, ·) and the conditional distribution
where p † (·, ·) is identified and y = y(p, z, d ).
The proof of (i) follows Matzkin (2003) as P is independent of d given Z from B1. Though
is not independent of c given Z, the proof of (ii) is only slightly more involved as it exploits B3-(iii). The latter says that for any (z, d ) there exists a price
] is equal to the reference output y o (z) in B3-(i). As y o (z) can be chosen arbitrarily by Lemma 5, this condition actually requires 
given Z is identified.
Model Restrictions and The Cost of Public Funds
In this section, we first characterize the model restrictions on observables. These restrictions can be used to test the validity of the model. Second, we address the problem of identification of λ(·). Our pevious identification results can be used when the cost of public funds is known. Several studies provide macroeconomic estimates of the latter based on general equilibrium models. For instance, Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) find that the cost of public funds in the US ranges from 0.17 to 0.56 per dollar, while Jorgenson and Yun (1991) find 0.46 per dollar. See also Walters and Auriol (2007) for a recent survey on such estimates in various countries. Microeconomic data can complement these studies. In particular, one can expect that local economic conditions may affect the cost of public funds such as the local unemployment rate in Perrigne (2002) . We show that λ(·) is not identified. We then discuss several identifying conditions and derive a simple expression for λ(·). This section concludes with several extensions of our results.
Model Restrictions
We first define the random shocks as identified functions of the observables given λ(·).
Specifically, from (37) and (39) satisfies
(Y, P, Z) and (Y, C, P, Z), namely φ d (Y, P, Z) and φ c (Y, C, P, Z), respectively. From (21) and Proposition 4, t can be expressed as an identified function of (Y, C, P, T, Z), namely φ t (Y, C, P, T, Z).
Their expressions are given in the next lemma.
Lemma 6: Given A1-A3 and B1-B3, the random shocks (27) and (28) Thus A2-A3 need not be satisfied by structures in S. The next lemma shows that C1 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the properties of Lemmas 1-2 and Proposition 3 to hold. Namely,
C,P,T,Z) = T−E[T |P,Z]+ ∂E[T |P,Z]/∂p ∂E[C|P,Z]/∂p−[P y (P,Z)+µy(P,Z)] C−E[C|P,Z] , (43) and ∆(P, Z) is given by (27).

Next we weaken A2-A3. Our new assumptions are expressed in terms of the observables (Y, C, P, T, Z). We note that
d (z) = G −1 Y |P,Z (0|p o (z), z) and d (z) = G −1 Y |P,Z (1|p o (z), z). Assumption C1: Let d ∈[ d (z), d (z)] {y = y(p, z, d ), p ∈ [p(z), p
(z)]} be nonempty for every z ∈ Z, where y(·, ·, ·) is given by (37). The cost of public funds λ(·) and the joint distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z satisfy
(i) E[Y |p = p, Z = z] > 0, E[C|P = p, Z = z] > 0, (ii) Γ(p, z) > 0, ∂Γ(p, z)/∂p < 0, (iii) ∂∆(p, z)/∂p > 0 and Γ(p, z) < c o (p, z), where c o (p, z
) is given by (26), for any p ∈ [p(z), p(z)] and z ∈ Z. Moreover, (iv) φ d (Y, P, Z) and φ c (Y, C, P, Z) defined in (41) and (42), respectively, are conditionally independent of P given Z, while E[φ t (Y, C, P, T, Z)|P, Z] = 0, (v) G P |Z (·|·) has a strictly positive density on its support {(p, z) : p ∈ [p(z), p(z)], z ∈ Z} with p(·) < p(·), while G Y |P,Z (·|·, ·) and G C|Y,P,Z (·|·, ·, ·) are nondegenerated and strictly increasing in their first arguments.
Note that µ(·) = λ(·)/(1 + λ(·)), while ∆(p, z) and Γ(p, z) are defined in
P1:
The firm's objective function is strictly concave in effort so that there is a unique solution to the firm's effort maximization problem,
P2:
The optimal effort is strictly decreasing in θ so that the local SOC e (θ) ≤ e 2 (θ, θ) is satisfied,
P3:
The optimal price schedule is strictly increasing in θ,
P4:
Truth telling provides the global maximum of the firm's problem,
P5:
The expected transfer is strictly decreasing in the firm's cost inefficiency.
In other words, A2-A3 are sufficient but not necessary for such properties. Hereafter, the model is defined as the set of structures {S ∈ S; S satisfies P 1 − P 5}. A conditional distribution for (Y, C, P, T ) given Z is induced by a structure S ∈ S if (Y, C, P, T, Z) satisfies (17)- (21) for some optimal effort e * (θ, Z).
Lemma 7: If S ∈ S satisfies P1-P5, then the conditional distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z induced by S satisfies C1. Conversely, if the cost of public fund λ(·) and the conditional distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z satisfy C1, then there exists a structure in S satisfying P1-P5 and rationalizing the observations (Y, C, P, T ) given Z.
The first part of Lemma 7 shows that A2-A3 are stronger than C1 because any structure in S satisfying A2-A3 must also satisfy P1-P5 by Lemmas 1-2 and Proposition 3. This arises as C1 provides parsimonious conditions on the observables relying on the first-order and second-order conditions and the implementation. The two parts of Lemma 7 show 16 Specifically, from (29), R(p, z) > 0 is equivalent to having its denominator negative, i.e. Γ(p, z) < 
Identification of λ(·)
The next proposition shows that the cost of public funds is not identified.
Proposition 6: In the model consisting of structures S ∈ S satisfying P1-P5, the cost of public funds λ(·) is not identified.
This result is a consequence of Lemma 7. Given a structure S ∈ S satisfying P1-P5, the proof shows that there exists another cost of public fundsλ(·) in a structureS ∈ S that is observationally equivalent to S. Given that λ(·) is not identified, we consider some identifying conditions. Another strategy would be to consider set identification, i.e. the restrictions on λ(·) embodied in C1, and to derive some bounds for λ(·) given the distribution of (Y, C, P, T, Z) in the spirit of Manski and Tamer (2002) and Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2007) .
Up to now, we have imposed a weak assumption on t , namely E[ t |P, Z] = 0. Imposing additional assumptions on t is a natural way to achieve identification of λ(·). In view of B1, which assumes that ( d , c ) are conditionally independent of θ, a first strategy is to strengthen the mean independence of t from θ given Z by assuming that t is independent of θ given Z. In this case, we have t = φ t (Y, C, P, T, Z; λ) and θ = θ * (P, Z; λ), where we have indicated the dependence of these identified functions on λ(·). Thus, the conditional independence of φ t (Y, C, P, T, Z; λ) and θ * (P, Z; λ) given Z leads to some conditional moment restrictions such as their conditional covariance equal to zero. The latter can then be used to identify λ(·). Given the nonlinearity of (43) and (32) 
(·).
A second and more standard strategy is to achieve identification through an instrument W that is conditionally independent of t given (θ, Z) leading to the conditional moment
by B1. In this case, we have E[W (T − E(T |P, Z))|P, Z] + K(P, Z; µ)E[W (C − E(C|P, Z))|P, Z] = 0, where K(P, Z; µ) is the coefficient of C − E(C|P, Z) in (43). We can then solve for µ provided E[W (C − E(C|P, Z))|P, Z]
= 0, i.e. the instrument W must be correlated with
∂E [T |P=p,Z=z] ∂p
for any p ∈ [p(z), p(z)] and z ∈ Z provided Cov(W, T |P, Z) = 0. In other words, a valid instrument W should be uncorrelated with t but correlated with the transfer T and the cost C given (P, Z). In particular, this excludes P or any variable in Z as these variables are uncorrelated with T and C given (P, Z).
A natural candidate for a valid instrument can be the cost as C is correlated with itself and T provided that it is independent of t .
Under B1, C2 requires that C and t are uncorrelated given (θ, Z) or equivalently given (P, Z). In particular, because P = p * (θ, Z) and e = e * (θ, Z), it follows from (17)- (18) that
is independent of t given (θ, Z). The next proposition establishes the nonparametric identification of λ(·) from observations (Y, C, P, T, Z).
Proposition 7: Under A1, B1-B3 and C1-C2, the cost of public funds λ(·) is uniquely determined by λ(z) = µ(z)/[1 − µ(z)], where
with
Because p can be chosen arbitrarily, (45) shows that µ(·) and hence λ(·) are overidentified.
Thus, weaker assumptions than C2 can be exploited to achieve identification of the cost of public funds. For instance, we could assume that C2 holds for the most efficient firm only. In this case, (45) holds at p = p(z) only.
Extensions
17
While acknowledging the richness of procurement and regulation models based on asym-17 This section owes much to discussions with David Martimort.
metric information, Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) and Joskow (2005) have also emphasized the importance of investment and the dynamic aspects. The extensions in this section attempt to take into account these factors. We maintain the same assumptions as before, namely A1, B1-B3 and C1-C2.
18
In addition to the random transfer that was introduced in Section 3.1 to take into account political and legal factors that may affect the observed payment, the principal may not weigh equally the consumers' interests and the firm's profit as the principal may be elected or captured by some interest groups. This aspect can be formally introduced in the model through a weight κ(·) on the consumer surplus in the social welfare (8). The random transfer and the weighted consumer surplus could respond to some critics of the normative approach taken by Laffont and Tirole (1986) . In particular, the introduction Turning to the identification of (λ(·), κ(·)) or equivalently (µ(·), ν(·)), we note that (44) remains valid with µ replaced by ν. Thus, Proposition 7 applies thereby identifying ν(·).
To identify µ(·), we use exclusion restrictions. Specifically, we partition the vector Z in some variables Z 1 affecting only µ(·) or equivalently λ(·), some variables Z 2 affecting only F (·|·) and the other variables Z 3 . As noted previously, Z 1 can be the local unemployment rate affecting the cost of public funds. To identify µ(·), we can use (34), which gives
Evaluating the right-hand side of (34) at two values of z 3 gives an equation in µ(z 1 ), thereby identifying the latter.
Regarding investment, consider the case of a sunk investment that is contractible. The 18 In particular, we still assume a risk neutral agent. However, the agent may exhibit "mean-variance" preferences as in Laffont and Tirole (1993, p.105) . Restricting the transfer to be linear in the ex post performance indicator, then the fraction borne by the firm decreases as expected. Identification of risk aversion is known to be difficult. See Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and for the identification of risk aversion in auctions.
principal offers a contract to the firm. The firm then chooses its sunk investment and learns its type after investment is made. The rest of the timing remains the same in terms of effort choice and ex post performance observation. An interesting feature of this case is that investment I affects the distribution of types, i.e. F (θ|I, Z). As shown in Laffont and Tirole (1993, p.90) with ex post participation constraint, the first-order conditions for price and effort are still given by (12) and (13). Implementation can be achieved by the optimal payment (15) 
To identify F (·|·, ·), we assume that a subset of variables Z 1 affects only F (·|·, ·), Second, if the types are independent over time, the optimal contracts combine the optimal static contract in the first period and the optimal contract written ex ante for the second period. Thus, the firm's rent and transfer vary over the periods. Cross-section or panel data can be analyzed as long as the analyst observes the period to which the contract applies. In particular, if the firm has the possibility of leaving the relationship at the end of the first period, the transfer in the first period is the same as (15). In this case, our previous results apply for the observations in the first period, while our results would need to be adjusted for observations in the second period due to the different transfer.
Data from the first period would allow us to identify all the model primitives given the exogenous variables of the first period Z 1 , while data from the second period would allow us to identify them given the exogenous variables of both periods (Z 1 , Z 2 ).
Third, if the types are (imperfectly) correlated over the periods, the theoretical analysis becomes more complex as the principal can use the observation of the first period to upgrade his prior on the firm's type in the second period. 20 Both contracts are offered in the first period after the firm learns his first type θ 1 , while the second period type θ 2 is learned after the first period contract realization. Regarding the first period, the firstorder conditions (12) and (13) apply. For the second period, an additional distortion to the optimal effort in (13) is introduced because the principal revises his prior on θ 2 after the firm reveals θ 1 . Moreover, transfers take different forms for both periods. Consequently, our results need to be adjusted. Here again, panel data can be analyzed as long as the contract period is observed. Combining data from the first and second periods can identify the model primitives and in particular F (θ 1 |Z 1 ) and F (θ 2 |θ 1 , Z 1 , Z 2 ). An interesting feature is that lagged endogenous variables of the first period such as
can be used as a conditioning variable to identify F (θ 2 |θ 1 , Z 1 , Z 2 ) without the need for identifying θ 1 explicitly.
Conclusion
This paper studies the nonparametric identification of contract models with adverse selection and moral hazard and more specifically the Laffont and Tirole's (1986) procurement model with expost observed cost. Exploiting the bijective mapping between the observed price and the agent's unknown type, we show that at a given cost of public funds we can recover the structure of the model, namely the demand and baseline cost, the effort disutility, the agent's type distribution, the deterministic transfer and the joint conditional distribution of the random shocks. We then identify the cost of public funds using some instrument. We also characterize all the restrictions that must be satisfied by the cost of public funds and the observables so that the latter can be rationalized by the model.
Our paper complements the structural analysis of data subject to asymmetric information such as in contracts, nonlinear pricing and insurance. Our results indicate that one does not have to rely on parametric functional forms to identify and estimate such models as our analysis can be extended to other models of incomplete information. As a matter of fact, the procurement model we consider includes some functions such as the effort disutility and the cost of public funds that do not appear in simpler models of asymmetric information under adverse selection only. This is the case for nonlinear pricing models as studied in Huang, Perrigne and Vuong (2008) . See also D'Haultfoeuille and More recently, a mixed model was used by Gayle and Miller (2008) to analyze CEO compensation. Our results can be applied to study a model of compensation based on some ex post performance indicator such as the worker's productivity or abnormal returns of the firm. More generally, our approach can be extended to cases in which the Principal's behavior arises from some equilibrium condition associated with some game as long as the first-order condition involves some hazard rate in the socalled virtual cost as in (13).
The problem of estimating and testing such models needs to be addressed. First, tests of the model validity can be developed based on Lemma 7, which provides all the restrictions imposed by the procurement model. Second, incomplete information is generally assumed. It would be interesting to assess the relevance of such an hypothesis.
The restrictions imposed by a complete information model would allow one to test which model (incomplete or complete information) is the most accurate to explain the data.
The problem of testing adverse selection has known a vivid interest recently and some tests have been developed within the reduced form approach. See Chiappori and Salanié (2000) .
Lastly, it remains to develop a nonparametric estimation procedure and to study its asymptotic properties. Our results show how to express the model primitives from the reduced form probability distribution of the observables through various conditional expectations. A multistep estimation procedure can be entertained. A first step consists in estimating the cost of public funds using nonparametric regression estimators on (45).
The demand is then estimated by a nonparametric quantile regression of Y on (P, Z)
given an arbitrary choice of p o (·) using (37). A second step would consist in estimating the expected baseline cost using (26) and the deterministic transfer (30). With an estimate for the expected baseline cost at hand, we then obtain estimates of the relative cost inefficiency by (27) and the two functions (28) and (29) that are needed in the estimation of the effort disutility (30) and the firm's type (32). This step relies on nonparametric estimators for the conditional price density and distribution. A third step consists in estimating the conditional type density using the estimated types obtained previously following Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) . The baseline cost is estimated by a nonparametric quantile regression of the recovered baseline cost value C o on (Y, P, Z) given an arbitrary choice of y o (·) using (39). Lastly, the joint conditional distribution of error terms is obtained from the estimated error terms in (41), (42) and (43). A difficulty is that conditional expectations needs to be estimated at some boundaries of the support. Nonparametric estimation is known to introduce some boundary effects that can be alleviated by local polynomial estimators. In addition, a difficulty in establishing the asymptotic properties of this estimation procedure arises from its multi-step nature and the fact that some functions are estimated from recovered values instead of observed ones. Alternatively,
given that nonparametric identification has been established, the analyst can adopt a fully parametric or semiparametric econometric specification.
This appendix gives the proofs of the propositions and lemmas stated in Sections 3 and 4.
Proof of Lemma 3: LetỸ ,C,P ,T denote the endogenous variables under the structurẽ
We show that (Ỹ ,C,P ,T ) = (Y, C, P, T ) , which implies the desired result. (22) and (23), we note that
Now, we consider the FOC (19)- (20) for (P ,ẽ) and use (A.
From the solution p * (θ, z) and e * (θ, z) of (19)- (20), it follows thatP = p * (θ, Z) = P and (ẽ − α)/β = e * (θ, Z) = e. In particular, the latter implies thatẽ * (θ,
Moreover, becauseỸ =ỹ(P , Z,
Next, we turn to cost and transfer. From (18), and using (A.2),θ = α + βθ andẽ = α + βe, we haveC Moreover, from (20) and the previous results we obtaiñ
where the second equality uses (
, while the third equality follows from the change of variable u = (ũ − α)/β. Thus, (20) implies thatT = T sinceC = C,P = P and t = t . Lastly, because of the linear transformation given every value of Z, it is easy to verify that the structureS satisfies A1-A3 and B1 as soon as the structure S satisfies these assumptions.2
Proof of Lemma 4: Recall that P = p * (θ, Z), where p * (·, ·) is the optimal price schedule.
Assumption B1 implies that P is independent of d given Z. Hence, (17) gives
This establishes (25).
Regarding (23), we recall that θ can be expressed as a function θ * (P, Z) = p * −1 (P, Z), which is strictly increasing in P since P = p * (θ, Z) is strictly increasing in θ by Lemma 2. Thus, e can be expressed as a function e * (P, Z), which is strictly decreasing in P because e = e * (θ, Z)
is strictly decreasing in θ by Lemma 2, while θ = θ * (P, Z) is strictly increasing in P . Now, from (18) and using θ − e = θ * (P, Z) − e * (P, Z), we obtain 
1 by (24). Moreover, writing (A.3) at p = p(z), which is the price for the most efficient firm with type θ(z) and exerting the maximal effort e(z) = e * [θ(z), z], we obtain
because [θ(z) − e(z)] = 1 by the normalization (24).
Next, we write (19) at Z = z so that P = p * (θ, z) = p and e = e * (θ, z). Dividing the resulting equation by (A.3) we obtain
Integrating this differential equation from
is the price for the least efficient type when Z = z, we obtain
Solving for c o (p, z) and using the boundary condition (A.4) give (26).2
Proof of Proposition 4:
Because θ − e = θ * (p, z) − e * + (p, z), differentiating (27) with respect to p gives
where ∂θ * (·, ·)/∂p > 0 and ∂e * + (·, ·)/∂p < 0 from Lemma 2. In particular, θ = θ * (P, Z) and e = e * + (P, Z) are in bijections with P given Z. Thus, taking conditional expectation of (21) given (P, Z) = (p, z), and using (A.3) together with
, z] and e = e * + (p, z). Differentiating (A.6) gives
where we have used e * (θ, z) = e * + (p, z) = e. Thus, (A.5), (A.7) and (28) give
because ψ (·, z) > 0 by A2 and ∂e * + (p, z)/∂p < 0 by Lemma 2. Using (A.8)-(A.9) into (20) at Z = z so that P = p * (θ, z) = p and e = e * (θ, z), we obtain
where we have used the property that
is strictly increasing in p from Lemma 2.
We now solve (A.5) and (A.10) for ∂e * + (p, z)/∂p and ∂θ * (p, z)/∂p to obtain after some algebra
where R(p, z) is as given in (29) with R(p, z) > 0 because ∂e * + (·, z)/∂p < 0 by Lemma 2. Similarly, the right-hand side of (A.12) must be strictly positive because ∂θ * (·, z)/∂p > 0 by Thus, integrating (A.11) and (A.12) from some arbitrary p ∈ [p(z), p(z)] to p(z), and using the preceding boundary conditions, we obtain (31) and (32). As all the functions on the right-hand side of (32) are identified, it follows that θ * (·, ·) is identified. This establishes that F (·|·) is identified through 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
We can apply the same reasoning forc o (y, z,˜ c ). (38) and hence (37) using (A.13).
To prove (ii) we extend Matzkin's argument as Y = y(P, Z, d ) is not independent from c given Z in C o = c o (Y, Z, c ). On the other hand, we exploit the fact that P is independent from c given ( d , Z) because P = p * (θ, Z) and θ is independent of c given ( Γ(p, z) ∂e * + (p, z) ∂p dp = p(z) p Γ(p, z)R(p, z)dp, (A.15) where the second equality follows from p * + (0, z) = p(z) and (A.11). Thus, using (A.3), (A.6) and (A.8) into (21) R(p, z)dp, which is strictly decreasing as R(·, ·) > 0 from C1-(iii). The distribution F (θ|Z) is then defined as the distribution of θ * (P, Z) given Z.
Note that θ * (p, z) > 0 because ∆ (p, z) > R(p, z) by C1-(iii). Thus F (θ|z) admits a density, which is strictly positive on [θ(z), θ(z)] as defined in (34) and (35) by C1-(v). Moreover, P2-P3
hold from C1-(iii). For, P3 follows from θ * (p, z) > 0 and P2 follows from e * + (p, z) = −R(p, z) < 0 by C1-(iii). In addition, B2 is satisfied as θ(z) − e * (θ(z), z) = ∆(p(z), z) = 1 by (26) and (27), while e * (θ(z), z) = 0 because e * + (p(z), z) = 0 by construction and p * (·, z) strictly increasing leading to p(z) = p * (θ, z).
Note that ( d , c ) are conditionally independent of P given Z by Lemma 6 and C1-(iv), and hence of θ given Z. Moreover, (43) implies E[ t |P, Z] = 0. Thus, B1 and the second part of A1 are satisfied. Lastly, P1 and P4-P5 hold from C1-(ii). For, with the transfer (43), the proof of Lemma 1 shows that P1 is equivalent to ψ (e, z) > 0, which is ensured by ψ (e, z) = Γ (p, z)e * + (p, z), Γ (p, z) < 0 by C1-(ii) and e * + (p, z) < 0 as above. Similarly, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that P4 holds when e * (θ, z) < 0, which is established above. Moreover, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that P5 holds when ψ (e, z) > 0, which follows from C1-(ii). 2 Proof of Proposition 6: Let S = [y, c o , ψ, F, G, m, λ] be a structure satisfying P1-P5 and thus inducing a distribution for (Y, C, P, T ) given Z satisfying C1 by Lemma 7. Defineλ(·) = λ(·) + , with = 0 sufficiently small so thatλ(·) and the distribution of (Y, C, P, T ) given Z satisfy C1-(ii,iii). Note that C1-(i,v) are still satisfied as these assumptions do not involve
